What Really Happened to Nigeria’s Economy?

You may have heard the news that the size Nigeria’s economy now stands at nearly $500 billion. Taken at face value (as many commenters have seemed all to happy to do) this means that the West African state “overtook” South Africa’s economy, which was roughly $384 billion in 2012. Nigeria’s reported GDP for that year was $262 billion, meaning it roughly doubled in a year.

How did this “growth” happen? As Bloomberg reported:

On paper, the size of the economy expanded by more than three-quarters to an estimated 80 trillion naira ($488 billion) for 2013, Yemi Kale, head of the National Bureau of Statistics, said at a news conference yesterday to release the data in the capital, Abuja….

The NBS recalculated the value of GDP based on production patterns in 2010, increasing the number of industries it measures to 46 from 33 and giving greater weighting to sectors such as telecommunications and financial services.

The actual change appears to be due almost entirely to Nigeria including figures in GDP calculation that had been excluded previously. There is nothing wrong with this, per se, but it makes comparisons completely unrealistic. This would be like measuring your height in bare feet for years, then doing it while wearing platform shoes. Your reported height would look quite different, without any real growth taking place. Similar complications arise when comparing Nigeria’s new figures to other countries’, when the others have not changed their methodology.

Nigeria’s recalculation adds another layer of complexity to the problems plaguing African development statistics. Lack of transparency (not to mention accuracy) in reporting economic activity makes decisions about foreign aid and favorable loans more difficult. For more information on these problems, see this post discussing Morten Jerven’s book Poor NumbersIf you would like to know more about GDP and other economic summaries, and how they shape our world, I would recommend Macroeconomic Patterns and Stories (somewhat technical), The Leading Indicators, and GDP: A Brief but Affectionate History.

Mexico Update Following Joaquin Guzmán’s Capture

As you probably know by now, the Sinaloa cartel’s leader Joaquin Guzmán was captured in Mexico last Saturday. How will violence in Mexico shift following Guzman’s removal?

(Alfredo Estrella/AFP/Getty Images)

(Alfredo Estrella/AFP/Getty Images)

I take up this question in an article forthcoming in the Journal of Quantitative Criminology. According to that research (which used negative binomial modeling on a cross-sectional time series of Mexican states from 2006 to 2010), DTO leadership removals in Mexico are generally followed by increased violence. However, capturing leaders is associated with less violence than killing them. The removal of leaders for whom a 30 million peso bounty (the highest in my dataset, which generally identified high-level leaders) been offered is also associated with less violence. The reward for Guzmán’s capture was higher than any other contemporary DTO leader: 87 million pesos. Given that Guzmán was a top-level leader and was arrested rather than killed, I would not expect a significant uptick in violence (in the next 6 months) due to his removal. This follows President Pena Nieto’s goal of reducing DTO violence.

My paper was in progress for a while, so the data is a few years old. Fortunately Brian Phillips has also taken up this question using additional data and similar methods, and his results largely corroborate mine:

Many governments kill or capture leaders of violent groups, but research on consequences of this strategy shows mixed results. Additionally, most studies have focused on political groups such as terrorists, ignoring criminal organizations – even though they can represent serious threats to security. This paper presents an argument for how criminal groups differ from political groups, and uses the framework to explain how decapitation should affect criminal groups in particular. Decapitation should weaken organizations, producing a short-term decrease in violence in the target’s territory. However, as groups fragment and newer groups emerge to address market demands, violence is likely to increase in the longer term. Hypotheses are tested with original data on Mexican drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs), 2006-2012, and results generally support the argument. The kingpin strategy is associated with a reduction of violence in the short term, but an increase in violence in the longer term. The reduction in violence is only associated with leaders arrested, not those killed.

A draft of the full paper is here.

Who says North is “up”?

There are several childhood lessons that I trace back to dinners at Outback Steakhouse: the deliciousness of cheese fries, the inconvenience of being in the middle of a wraparound booth, and the historical contingency of North as “up” on maps.

Who started using the NESW arrangement that is virtually omnipresent on maps today? Was it due to the fact that civilization as we now know it developed in the Northern hemisphere? (Incidentally, that’s why clocks run clockwise–a sundial in the Southern hemisphere goes the other way around.)

That doesn’t appear to be the case according to Nick Danforth, who recently took on this question at al-Jazeera America (via Flowing Data):

There is nothing inevitable or intrinsically correct — not in geographic, cartographic or even philosophical terms — about the north being represented as up, because up on a map is a human construction, not a natural one. Some of the very earliest Egyptian maps show the south as up, presumably equating the Nile’s northward flow with the force of gravity. And there was a long stretch in the medieval era when most European maps were drawn with the east on the top. If there was any doubt about this move’s religious significance, they eliminated it with their maps’ pious illustrations, whether of Adam and Eve or Christ enthroned. In the same period, Arab map makers often drew maps with the south facing up, possibly because this was how the Chinese did it.

So who started putting North up top? According to Danforth, that was Ptolemy:

[He] was a Hellenic cartographer from Egypt whose work in the second century A.D. laid out a systematic approach to mapping the world, complete with intersecting lines of longitude and latitude on a half-eaten-doughnut-shaped projection that reflected the curvature of the earth. The cartographers who made the first big, beautiful maps of the entire world, Old and New — men like Gerardus MercatorHenricus Martellus Germanus and Martin Waldseemuller — were obsessed with Ptolemy. They turned out copies of Ptolemy’s Geography on the newly invented printing press, put his portrait in the corners of their maps and used his writings to fill in places they had never been, even as their own discoveries were revealing the limitations of his work.

map_projectionsPtolemy probably had his reasons, but they are lost to history. As Danforth concludes, “The orientation of our maps, like so many other features of the modern world, arose from the interplay of chance, technology and politics in a way that defies our desire to impose easy or satisfying narratives.” Yet another example of a micro-institution that rules our world.

African Statistics and the Problem of Measurement

We have briefly mentioned Morten Jerven’s work Poor Numbers before, but it deserves a bit more attention. The book discusses the woeful state of GDP figures in Africa and the issues that arise in making cross-national comparisons between countries whose statistical offices operate very differently (interview here).

Discussing Jerven’s work now is especially timely given current events. Jerven was scheduled to speak at UNECA on statistical capacity in Africa. However, Pali Lehohla of South Africa strongly objected to Jerven’s ideas and led the opposition which ultimately prevented Jerven from speaking. Had he been allowed to present, Jerven’s speech would have summarized the issues thusly: 

I would argue that ambitions should be tempered in international development statistics. The international standardization of measurement of economic development has led to a procedural bias. There has been a tendency to aim for high adherence to procedures instead of focusing on the content of the measures. Development measures should be taken as a starting point in local data availability, and statisticians should refrain from reporting aggregate measures that appear to be based on data but in fact are very feeble projections or guesses. This means that it is necessary to shift the focus away from formulas, standards, handbooks, and software. What matters are what numbers are available and how good those numbers are. Comparability across time and space needs to start with the basic input of knowledge, not with the system in which this information is organized. (Jerven, 2013, p.107).

African Arguments gave Jerven a chance to respond to his opposition:

The initial response from many economists working on Africa varied between, ‘so what?…we already know this’, ‘we don’t trust or use official statistics on Africa anyhow’ and ‘I know but what is the alternative?’ Many more scholars in African studies and development studies, who were generally concerned with the long-standing use of numbers on Africa as ‘facts’, were relieved that there was finally someone who sought, not only to unveil the real state of affairs, but genuinely wanted to answer some of the problems that users face when trying to use the data to test their scholarly questions….

We need to rethink the demand for data and how we invest in data in Africa and beyond. My focus has been on Africa because the problem is particularly striking there. To fix the gaps we should first re-think the MDG and other donor agendas for data and do a cost benefit analysis – what are the costs of providing these data and what is the opportunity cost of providing these data? The opportunity cost is often ignored. Local demand for data needs to come into focus. A statistical office is only sustainable if it serves local needs for information. Statistics is a public good, and we need a good open debate on how to supply them.

This is a major issue, and all social scientists–not just economists–should be aware of Jerven’s work. As James C. Scott has pointed out, measurement is a political act.

Organized Crime Roundup

I have been arguing for years that organized crime has an inherently political component. Certainly I am not alone, and researchers far superior to me have made the same point–for example, Charles Tilly and James Buchanan. However, mainstream political reporting seems to have been catching onto this over the past few months. I have rounded up a few of these posts that will be of interest to long-time readers. See also my working paper on violence following targeted leadership removals in Mexico.

Are Mexican Drug Lords the Next ‘Terrorist Targets’?” by Douglas Lucas. Lucas accurately describes the framing of drug lords as terrorists to be a form of “mission creep.”

Peter Andreas responds to Moisés Naim’s essay in “Measuring the Mafia-State Menace.” I was not aware of Andreas’s work until Daniel Solomon recently shared it on Twitter but now I have several of his books (including this one) on my reading list.

Although somewhat sensationalized, Christian Caryl also has a nice overview piece on global organized crime at Foreign Policy: “Mob Rule.” Some of the statistics there seem questionable but the overall point–that students of politics should pay attention to organized crime–is a valid and important one.

Finally, World Politics Review features an interview with Brian Phillips, who argues that targeting DTO leaders in Mexico has not reduced violence. This matches my own research on the topic.

Currency and Conflict

According to Lebanon’s Daily Star:

Traders across Syria reported widely fluctuating rates and two currency dealers in Damascus, where the pound appeared to be hit hardest, said it fell below 200 to the dollar for the first time in what one described as panic buying of the U.S. currency.

On Monday evening the pound traded at 205 to the dollar, down 20 percent in four days and 77 percent down since the start of the anti-Assad uprising in March 2011 when it was at 47.

The idea of examining currency prices over the course of a conflict is interesting. There are a number of confounders of course. For instance, the regime can often intervene in certain ways to affect the value of currency. Other incidents besides the conflict itself can also drive currency fluctuations, especially when the conflict is relatively minor.

One nice case (from strictly a research perspective) is the US Civil War, when both the Union and Confederacy issued their own notes. Jeffrey Arnold‘s project, “Pricing the Costly Lottery: Financial Market Reactions to Battlefield Events in the American Civil War,” leverages this fact to see how markets responded to successes and failures of either side. We discussed this project before when it was presented as a poster at PolMeth 2012, and Jeffrey’s website now has his MPSA 2013 slides.

Here’s his abstract, and one of my favorite graphs:

What role does combat play in resolving the disagreement that initiated war? Bargaining theories of war propose two mechanisms, the destruction of capabilities and the revelation of private information. These mechanisms are difficult to analyze quantitatively because the mechanisms are observationally equivalent, the participants’ expectations are unobservable, and there is a lack of data on battles. With new methods and new data on the American Civil War, I address these challenges. I estimate the information revealed by combat with a model of Bayesian learning. I use prices of Union and Cnnnonfederate currencies to measure public expectations of war duration and outcome. Data on battlefield events come from detailed data on the outcomes and casualties of the battles of the American Civil War. The results suggest that battle outcomes rather than casualties or information revelation had the largest influence on the expected duration of the American Civil War.


Mapping Literal Place Names

Place names are another one of those micro-institutions. They often carry a linguistic legacy indicating some important discoverer, inhabitant, or conqueror. Changes in place names are significant too. (Would Sinatra’s “New Amsterdam, New Amsterdam” have rolled off the tongue nearly as nicely?) As the names accumulate history and new generations become accustomed to them, however, we often lose the literal sense of their meaning. In an effort to help undo that, the Atlas of True Names “reveals the etymological roots, or original meanings,of the familiar terms on today’s maps of the World, Europe, the British Isles and the United States.”

Here are a couple of examples, and there is much more at the link:



Risk, Overreaction, and Control

11-M_El_How many people died because of the September 11 attacks? The answer depends on what you are trying to measure. The official estimate is around 3,000 deaths as a direct result of hijacked aircraft and at the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and in Pennsylvania. Those attacks were tragic, but the effect was compounded by overreaction to terrorism. Specifically, enough Americans substituted driving for flying in the remaining months of 2001 to cause 350 additional deaths from accidents.

David Myers was the first to raise this possibility in a December, 2001, essay. In 2004, Gerd Gigerenzer collected data and estimated the 350 deaths figure, resulting from what he called “dread risk”:

People tend to fear dread risks, that is, low-probability, high-consequence events, such as the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. If Americans avoided the dread risk of flying after the attack and instead drove some of the unflown miles, one would expect an increase in traffic fatalities. This hypothesis was tested by analyzing data from the U.S. Department of Transportation for the 3 months following September 11. The analysis suggests that the number of Americans who lost their lives on the road by avoiding the risk of flying was higher than the total number of passengers killed on the four fatal flights. I conclude that informing the public about psychological research concerning dread risks could possibly save lives.

Does the same effect carry over to other countries and attacks? Alejandro López-Rousseau looked at how Spaniards responded to the March 11, 2004, train bombings in Madrid. He found that activity across all forms of transportation decreased–travelers did not substitute driving for riding the train.

What could explain these differences? One could be that Americans are less willing to forego travel than Spaniards. Perhaps more travel is for business reasons and cannot be delayed. Another possibility is that Spanish citizens are more accustomed to terrorist attacks and understand that substituting driving is more risky than continuing to take the train. There are many other differences that we have not considered here–the magnitude of the two attacks, feelings of being “in control” while driving, varying cultural attitudes.

This post is simply meant to make three points. First, reactions to terrorism can cause additional deaths if relative risks are not taken into account. Cultures also respond to terrorism in different ways, perhaps depending on their previous exposure to violent extremism. Finally, the task of explaining differences is far more difficult than establishing patterns of facts.

(For more on the final point check out Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, which motivated this post.)

Python for Political Scientists, Spring 2013 Recap

pythonThis spring Josh Cutler‘s Python course was back by popular demand. (This time it was known as “Computational Political Economy” but I like the less formal title.) I participated this time around as a teaching assistant rather than student, and it was a thoroughly enjoyable experience. The course syllabus and schedule is on Github.

Class participants were expected to have a basic familiarity with Python from going through Zed Shaw’s book over Christmas break outside of class. Each Tuesday Josh would walk them through a new computer science concept and explain how it could be used for social science research. These topics included databases, networks, web scraping, and linear programming. On Thursdays they would come to a lab session and work together in small groups to solve problems or answer questions based on some starter code that I supplied. I generally tried to make the examples relevant and fun but you would have to ask them whether I succeeded.

The class ended this past Saturday with final presentations, which were all great. The first project scraped data from the UN Millenium Development Goal reports and World Bank statistics to compare measures of maternal mortality in five African countries and show how they differed–within the same country! This reminded me of Morten Jerven’s book Poor Numbers on the inaccuracy of African development statistics (interview here).

In the second presentation, simulated students were treated with one of several education interventions to see how their abilities changed over time. These interventions could be applied uniformly to everyone or targeted at those in the bottom half of the distribution. Each child in the model had three abilities that interacted in different ways, and interventions could target just one of these abilities or several in combination. Combining these models with empirical data on programs like Head Start is an interesting research program.

The third presentation also used a computational model. Finding equilibrium networks of interstate alliances is incredibly difficult (if not impossible) to do analytically when the number of states is large. The model starts with pre-specified utility functions and runs until the network hits an equilibria. Changing starting values allows for the discovery of multiple equilibria. This model will also be combined with empirical data in the future.

For the fourth and final presentation, one participant collected data on campaign events in Germany for each of the political parties during the current election cycle. This reminded me of a Washington Post website (now taken down) detailing campaign visits in 2008 that I scraped last year and used in lab once this semester.

These examples show the wide variety of uses for programming in social science. From saving time in data collection to generating models that could not be done without the help of algorithms, a little bit of programming knowledge goes a long way. Hopefully courses like this will become more prominent in social science graduate (and undergraduate) programs over the coming years. Thanks to Josh and all the class participants for making it a great semester!


Note: I am happy to give each of the presenters credit for their work, but did not want to reveal their names here due to privacy concerns. If you have questions about any of the presentations I can put you in touch with their authors via email.

Kurds and Statelessness

Kurdish peshmerga--literally "those who face death"--standing guard at Shenarwe Mountain

Kurdish peshmerga–literally “those who face death”–standing guard at Shenarwe Mountain

Last week one of my academic heroes, James C. Scott, came to Duke to give two talks. The first was a lunchtime discussion of his recent book, Two Cheers for Anarchism. The second was a lecture elaborating on The Art of Not Being Governed. We have discussed the argument of the latter book here before. To oversimplify quite a bit, Scott says that the upland peoples of Southeast Asia consciously evaded the intrusion of lowland governments into their lives.

Scott recognizes that his argument applies outside of Asia as well, but does not delve into specifics. My favorite example of this is the Kurdish people, who are located in the mountainous region of northern Iraq, southern Turkey, northeastern Syria, and northwestern Iran. As Scott would say, they are at the periphery of several states and the center of none. It is also an increasingly strategic region, and Kurds find themselves in a position to shape the balance of power:

After decades of persecution and genocide, the Kurds have found a way to operate in a neighborhood where clear-cut borders can often be more of a nuisance than a boon. Loosely promised a state by the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, the Kurdish people have learned the hard way that maps don’t necessarily dictate facts on the ground, as any observer of Mideast history and politics can attest. “Though the Kurds are said to be the world’s largest stateless people,” writes Time contributor Pelin Turgut, “Kurdish leaders … say they are no longer interested in a single Kurdish state but in a loose federation that spans various national borders.” Rather than waiting for Mideast leaders or the international community to make a deal for a state, the Kurds seem to be playing a regional game of “Let’s Make A Deal.”

With the recent call for a ceasefire by PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, Kurdish-Turkish relations appear to be improving. This is an important transition since until now Kurdish leaders have been closer to Baghdad than Ankara. Bashar al-Assad has recently increased Kurdish autonomy as he seeks their support in Syria’s civil war. To take an optimistic view, this stateless people may soon find themselves playing kingmaker in the region.

See also: The Kurdish Factor” by Matthieu Akins